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STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY-FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY
WARN-SECTION 402A-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has de-
termined that in a strict products liability action for failure to ade-
quately warn of a product's inherent dangers the determination of
whether the warning is adequate is a question of law to be made by
the trial judge.
Mackowick v Westinghouse Electric Corp., - Pa -, 575 A2d
100 (1990).
On December 28, 1982, plaintiff-appellant William Mackowick,
an electrician with 30 years experience, was installing an electrical
capacitor in a restricted "high voltage" room at Western Pennsyl-
vania Hospital in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.1 One of Mackowick's
co-workers removed the cover from an operating capacitor 2 built
by Westinghouse Electric Corporation, and Mackowick pointed to-
wards the capacitor to warn his coworker of the danger posed by
the live fuses within it.3 As Mackowick pointed his screwdriver to-
wards the capacitor, an electrical charge "arced" from the uninsu-
lated fuses within the capacitor to his screwdriver, severely shock-
ing and burning him.
4
A few weeks prior to the accident, Mackowick had removed the
lid to the Westinghouse capacitor while working at the same job
site.5 On the cover of the capacitor was a warning which read:
THIS CAPACITOR CONTAINS BUILT-IN DISCHARGE RESISTORS.
CAUTION! WAIT FIVE MINUTES AFTER DISCONNECTING. THEN
SHORT CIRCUIT THE TERMINALS AND GROUND THE CAPACI-
TOR BEFORE HANDLING.6
Mackowick 7 .filed suit against Westinghouse in- the Common
Pleas Court of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania alleging that West-
1. Mackowick v Westinghouse Elec. Corp., - Pa - , 575 A2d 100, 101 (1990).
2. A capacitor is a metal box holding live, uninsulated fuses which accumulates and
holds charges of electricity. Mackowick, 575 A2d at 104.
3. Id at 101. Mackowick's co-worker testified that he removed the lid to the existing
capacitor to make certain that the new capacitors were being installed properly. Mackowick
v Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 373 Pa Super 434, 437, 541 A2d 749, 750 (1988).
4. Mackowick, 575 A2d at 101.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Mackowick's wife was also a plaintiff in the action alleging loss of consortium as a
result of the injury. Mackowick, 541 A2d at 750.
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inghouse, as manufacturer of the capacitor, had failed to provide
adequate warning of the danger of "arcing" posed by the uninsu-
lated fuses inside the capacitor and was, therefore, strictly liable
for the harm resulting from the accident.8 Westinghouse answered
the complaint, alleging that Mackowick had assumed the risk of
injury by pointing his screwdriver near the live, uninsulated fuses
due to the fact that he was an experienced electrician who knew of
the danger of "arcing" from a devise such as the capacitor."
At trial, Westinghouse produced uncontested expert testimony
that "arcing" could only occur when an object was within forty
one-thousandths of an inch from the capacitor."0 The trial court
instructed the jury on assumption of the risk, but refused to give
the instruction requested by Mackowick.1' The jury found for the
defendant Westinghouse, and Mackowick appealed."2 The superior
court affirmed the decision of the trial court. 3
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered
whether the trial court's instruction to the jury on assumption of
the risk was a correct statement of Pennsylvania law."' Mackowick
contended that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that he
did not need to know of the particular defect involved in order to
assume the risk. 5 In raising this contention, Mackowick relied
upon the prior Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision of Berkebile
v Brantly Helicopter Corporation,8 which held that a plaintiff in a
8. Mackowick, 575 A2d at 101..
9. Id.
10. Mackowick, 541 A2d at 750. The expert estimated this distance to be about the
width of the lead on a thick lead pencil. Id.
11. Id. The trial judge instructed the jury as follows:
For you to find that a Plaintiff assumed the risk of his injury, you must find that the
Plaintiff was aware of the danger presented by Defendant's product and. . . volunta-
rily proceeded to encounter that danger. The Plaintiff must have realized the danger,
but not necessarily the specific defect itself, just the danger.
Mackowick, 575 A2d at 102. The plaintiffs requested an instruction directing that in order
to be barred from recovery the plaintiff had to know of the specific danger which resulted in
his injury. Id.
12. Id at 101.
13. Mackowick, 373 Pa Super 434, 541 A2d 749 (1988). A panel of the superior court
first heard the case and reversed the trial court, remanding for a new trial. Petition for
reargument was granted before the court en banc, and the judgment of the trial court was
thereupon affirmed. Mackowick, 575 A2d at 102.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 462 Pa 83, 337 A2d 893 (1975). Berkebile was a plurality opinion involving defects
in a commercial helicopter, one of which was a failure to provide adequate warnings. The
defendant asserted the defense of assumption of the risk. Berkebile, 337 A2d at 893.
Berkebile is discussed more fully at Notes 66 to 79 and accompanying text.
Recent Decisions
strict liability action is precluded from recovery only if he is aware
of the specific defect which eventually causes his injury and pro-
ceeds to use the product with knowledge of the danger posed by
the defect. 7
The supreme court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Nix,18 first
considered whether the trial judge should have allowed the ques-
tion of product defect to go to the jury." The court determined
that Mackowick was not seeking to recover on the basis of a
mechanical defect, but rather was alleging that the warnings pro-
vided by Westinghouse did not adequately divulge the inherent
dangers of the product.20 Therefore, the court said, the product
would be defective for purposes of strict liability if distributed
without warnings sufficient to notify the ultimate user or consumer
of the inherent dangers in the product.2 The court then said that
"[t]he duty to adequately warn does not require the manufacturer
to educate a neophyte in the principles of the product. A warning
of inherent dangers is sufficient if it adequately notifies the in-
tended user of the unobvious dangers inherent in the product.
' '22
Based on these principles, the court determined that the ques-
tion of whether a product is defective due to insufficient warnings
is a question of law for determination by the trial judge.23 The ma-
jority then considered Mackowick's contention that the capacitor
was defective for lack of a warning about the inherent danger of
"arcing. ' '24 The court reasoned that arcing was not the characteris-
tic of the product which required a warning, but rather the danger
of live, exposed electricity which created a likelihood of arcing re-
quired a warning. 25 The basis for the majority's reasoning on this
point was that 1) the capacitor was in a restricted access room with
a high voltage warning on the door, 2) the only personnel allowed
in the room (and therefore the only ones using the product) would
be skilled electricians, and 3) skilled electricians were fully aware
17. Berkebile, 337 A2d at 901.
18. The Chief Justice was joined in his opinion by Justices Flaherty, McDermott, and
Zappala. Justice Papadakos concurred in the result. Justice Larsen filed a dissenting opin-
ion. Mackowick, 575 A2d at 100.
19. Id at 102.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. Emphasis in original.
23. Id.
24. Id at 103.
25. Id.
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of the danger of arcing from high concentrations of electricity. 6
On this basis, the majority held that the warning was sufficient
as a matter of law and that Mackowick's strict liability claim
should never have gone to the jury.27 Consequently, the court de-
termined it was unnecessary to address Mackowick's claim that the
trial court's instructions to the jury were incorrect since no issue of
fact remained for the jury to consider.
2 8
Justice Larsen filed a dissenting opinion in which he first noted
that the appellant had instituted the products liability action on
theories of both design defect and failure to warn.29 Justice Larsen
then asserted that the majority had erroneously decided the case
on an issue not properly before it (i.e., whether the trial court
erred in sending the issue of inadequate warning to the jury) be-
cause it was not raised in the lower court and was not briefed by
the parties.30
Addressing what he felt to be the only issue properly before the
court, that of the trial judge's instructions31 to the jury, Justice
Larsen stated that the trial judge's instructions were a misstate-
ment of Pennsylvania law as enunciated in Ferraro v Ford Motor
Co., 32 which adopted section 402A, comment n of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts as the law of Pennsylvania.3 Therefore, rea-
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id at 104.
29. Id.
30. Id at 105. In support of his contention that the issue addressed by the court was
one which was not properly before it, Justice Larsen cited Pa R A P 302(a) (issues not
raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be addressed for the first time on appeal).
Mackowick, 575 A2d at 105.
Justice Larsen also noted that he disagreed with the majority's holding in the case and
would have allowed the issue of defect due to inadequate warning to go to the jury. Id at
105, n.1.
31. See note 11.
32. 423 Pa 324, 327, 223 A2d 746, 748 (1966). In Ferraro, the plaintiff was injured
while driving a Ford truck he knew to be defective. At trial, the jury awarded judgment to
the plaintiff, and the trial judge entered judgment n. o. v. for the defendant. On appeal, the
state supreme court reversed, holding that the issue of whether the plaintiff could have
reasonably relied on the dealer's employees' assurances that the truck was safe to drive was
a question for the jury. Ferraro, 223 A2d at 748. Ferraro is discussed more fully at notes 48
to 52 and accompanying text.
33. Mackowick, 575 A2d at 105. Comment n of section 402A provides:
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists
merely in failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the possi-
bility of its existence. On the other hand the form of contributory negligence which
consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger,
and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this
Section as in other cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers the de-
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soned Justice Larsen, in order to be barred from recovery under
Pennsylvania law, the plaintiff must have known that the electric-
ity could have arced to him and the danger that this posed.3 4 Jus-
tice Larsen suggested that the trial judge's instructions to the jury
on assumption of the risk were erroneous, as they indicated that
the plaintiff would be unable to recover if he knew only of the gen-
eral danger of being exposed to large concentrations of electricity
flowing through the capacitor.3
Noting that the plaintiff had testified he did not know that arc-
ing could occur from the live fuse and that he believed his hand to
be in a safe position when he pointed towards the capacitor, Jus-
tice Larsen felt that a proper instruction to the jury on assumption
of the risk would have provided adequate grounds for a jury to find
that the plaintiff did not assume the risk of injury due to arcing.
36
In order to fully understand the possible impact of the Mack-
owick holding, a review of the development of strict products lia-
bility failure to warn law in Pennsylvania is helpful. The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court first adopted section 402A31 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts in Webb v Zern.s8 In Webb, the
fect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use
of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, comment n (1965).
34. Mackowick, 575 A2d at 106.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. The supreme court adopted the following language from the Restatement as the
law of Pennsylvania:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and care of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Webb v Zern, 422 Pa 424, 426, 220 A2d 853, 854 (1966) (citing Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A (1965)).
38. 422 Pa 424, 220 A2d 853 (1966). Justice Cohen delivered the opinion of the court.
Webb, 220 A2d at 854. In an abbreviated opinion, the court cited the reasoning from Jus-
tices Jones' and Roberts' concurring and dissenting opinions in Miller v Prietz, 422 Pa 383,
221 A2d 320 (1966). Miller was an action against'the manufacturer and dealer of a vaporizer
for breach of implied warranty. The purchaser's nephew was killed when the vaporizer ex-
ploded. The Miller court read the term "family" in section 2-318 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code to include the decedent. Miller, 221 A2d at 321-24.
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plaintiff was severely injured when a keg of beer he had purchased
from the defendant distributor exploded.39 The plaintiff's com-
plaint proceeded on the theory that the keg had been in the exclu-
sive control of the defendant, thereby giving rise to an inference of
negligence. 0 Following the defendant's demurrer, the trial court
dismissed the plaintiff's complaint for failure to join as additional
defendant's plaintiff's father, who had purchased the keg, and his
brother, who had tapped it."1 On appeal, the issue before the su-
preme court was whether the plaintiff's complaint was sufficient to
state a cause of action in trespass.4 2 After determining that the
modern attitude was to extend strict liability to include product
defects, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed, directing the
trial court to allow plaintiff to amend his complaint to explicitly
state a cause of action in strict products liability.43 Justice Eagen
submitted a concurring opinion, stating that although he agreed
that section 402A should be adopted as the law of Pennsylvania, he
felt it should be limited to defects resulting in physical harm to the
user or the user's property. 4
Chief Justice Bell dissented in Webb, stating that the majority
had adopted the new field of law without referring to the extensive
prior decisions which were being overruled. 5 Further, the Chief
Justice wrote, the majority was undermining the values of cer-
tainty and stability which were so important to the judicial pro-
cess.4 6 The Chief Justice concluded by saying that the adoption of
strict liability in cases of product defect should have been made by
the legislature and not the judiciary.4 7




43. Id. At least twelve other jurisdictions had adopted some kind of strict products
liability prior to the Pennsylvania. Supreme Court's decision in Webb. 12 Vill L Rev 204, 206
(1966).
44. Webb, 220 A2d at 855. Justice Eagen also stated he felt that cases of economic
loss should be controlled by the.Uniform Commercial Code and that contributory negligence
and assumption of the risk should be complete defenses to the new field of strict products
liability claims. Id.
45. Id. Those cases cited by the Chief Justice as deserving more than a summary
overruling by the court were: Johnston v Dick, 401 Pa 637, 165 A2d 634 (1960); Saganwich v
Hachikian, 348 Pa 313, 35 A2d 343 (1944); Coralnick v Abbotts Dairies, Inc., 337 Pa 344, 11
A2d 143 (1940); Ebbert v Philidelphia Electric Co., 330 Pa 257, 198 A2d 323 (1938); Swee-
ney v Blue Anchor Beverage Co., 325 Pa 216, 189 A 331 (1937); West v Emanuel, 198 Pa
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In adopting section 402A, the Webb court failed to address
which defenses, if any, would be available to a defendant in a strict
products liability action. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court first
addressed this issue in Ferraro v Ford Motor Company."5 In that
case, the plaintiff was injured while driving a Ford truck which he
knew to be defective. "9 The plaintiff had taken the truck to the
Ford dealership to complain of the problems he was having with it,
he was assured by the dealer's mechanics that the defects were not
serious." On appeal from a judgment n. o. v. for the defendant
manufacturer, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the question of whether the plaintiff acted unreasonably in
relying on the mechanics' representations that he could safely con-
tinue to use the truck was improperly removed from the jury. 1 In
reaching this conclusion, the court held that, in products liability
actions, contributory negligence was not a defense, but the type of
assumption of the risk which consisted of voluntarily and unrea-
sonably encountering a known danger would be a defense to such
48. 423 Pa 324, 223 A2d 746 (1966). Justice Eagen wrote the opinion for a unanimous
court.
49. Ferraro, 223 A2d at 747. The plaintiff, Ferraro, had purchased the truck from
Toohey, an authorized Ford dealer. Id. On two occasions prior to the accident, Ferraro no-
ticed the wheel locked as he turned the truck and the accelerator pedal sometimes dis-
lodged. Id at 747-8. Ferraro took the truck to the Toohey dealership three times before the
accident and was repeatedly assured by employees of the dealership that the malfunctions
were not serious or dangerous. Id at 748. On the day of the accident, Ferraro was attempting
to make a sharp left turn in the truck when the wheel locked. Id at 747. In attempting to
apply the brake, Ferraro accidentally hit the accelerator pedal, causing it to temporarily
dislodge and resulting in a burst of fuel to the engine. Id. The truck raced forward, hitting a
house next to the highway and injuring Ferraro. Id.
At trial, the jury found for Ferraro and against Ford Motor Company in the amount of
$107,851.00. (Toohey, a corporation, was dissolved before service was effected.) Id. The
Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Alpern, J., set aside the verdict in favor of
Ferraro and rendered judgment notwithstanding the verdict, directing entry of judgment for
the manufacturer. Id. The basis for the trial court's holding was that Ferraro had been
grossly negligent in continuing to drive the truck for at least'six weeks after discovering the
defect. Id at 748. The court of common pleas also noted that the amount of the verdict was
startlingly excessive and would have required a new trial had a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict not been granted. Id at 749.
50. Id.
51. Id at 749. In support of this proposition the court cited comment a of section
496E:
Where, however, the plaintiff surrenders his better judgment upon an assurance of
safety or a promise of protection against the risk, he does not assume it unless the
known danger is so extreme that there can be no reasonable reliance upon such an
assurance, or unless so much time has elapsed without action that he can no longer
reasonably rely upon it.
Ferraro, 223 A2d at 749 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496E, comment a).
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an action. 2
In IncoUingo v Ewing,53 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court con-
sidered whether a drug manufacturer had a duty to warn the pre-
scribing doctor of the inherent dangers of the drug. The dispute in
Incollingo centered upon the death of Mary Ann Incollingo, a mi-
nor who allegedly died from the wrongful administration of a drug
called Chloromycetin.54 Mary Ann's parents sued Pierce Ewing, the
druggist, alleging that he negligently provided the drug without a
prescription. Ewing joined Parke, Davis Company, the manufac-
turer of Chloromycetin, as an additional defendant and also joined
two doctors who had previously prescribed the drug to Mary
Ann.58 The third party complaint against Parke, Davis contended
that the manufacturer had been negligent in failing to properly
test the drug, in failing to properly warn the doctors of the poten-
tially dangerous side effects of the drug, and in failing to take pre-
cautions to avert the injuries which resulted in Mary Ann's
death.5 6 At trial, the jury found in favor of the druggist, Ewing,
and against Parke, Davis and the two doctors in the sum of
$215,000. 5  The two doctors and Parke, Davis appealed .5
On appeal before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Parke, Davis
52. Ferraro, 223 A2d at 748. This proposition is directly in line with the view es-
poused in the Restatement section 402A, comment n.
53. 444 Pa 263, 282 A2d 206 (1971).
54. Incollingo, 282 A2d at 210. Mary Ann was originally given Chloromycetin from
October, 1958 to January, 1960 by her pediatrician for an infection of the mesentery glands
of the stomach. Id at 211. A refill was obtained in February of 1960 from Mrs. Incollingo's
osteopath, who issued the refill, without seeing Mary Ann, upon Mrs. Incollingo's assertions
that Mary Ann had a respiratory infection.,Id. Mrs. Incollingo had attempted to obtain the
refill from the pediatrician, who refused to issue it. Id at 210-11.
In May of 1960, Mrs. Incollingo brought Mary Ann back to the pediatrician, who diag-
nosed her as being afflicted with aplastic anemia, a form of blood dyscrasia. Id. This condi-
tion was conceded to be caused by the Chloromycetrin. Mary Ann died from the condiction
in March of 1962. Id at 212.
55. Id at 211. Domenico Cucinotta, M.D. (Mary Ann's pediatrician) and Samuel
Levin, D.O. (Mrs. Incollingo's osteopath). The third party complaint alleged the doctors had
been negligent in prescribing the drug without regard to its potentially dangerous side ef-
fects. Ewing also joined Lederle Laboratories. A voluntary non-suit was entered as to Led-
erie at the commencement of the trial upon agreement of all the parties. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. Each defendant except Ewing filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict and, alternatively, for a new trial. All were refused by the trial court which entered
judgment on the verdicts. Id.
58. Id at 219. At trial, no evidence was introduced in support of the allegations of
failure of Parke, Davis to perform proper tests or negligence in manufacture. The issue on
appeal was, therefore, whether the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of negligent
failure to warn. Id.
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asserted three grounds in support of a judgment n. o. v.:5 9 (1) that
the warning on the drug was adequate as a matter of law, (2) that
based upon his own testimony the warning was adequate as to the
first prescribing doctor, and (3) that although portions of the other
prescribing doctor's testimony indicated that he had not been
properly warned, there was not sufficient evidence to establish that
the dosages prescribed by this doctor were the effective cause of
Mary Ann Incollingo's death. 0
The majority6' in Incollingo first noted that drug manufacturers
were traditionally held to a high degree of care.2 However, the
court said, strict liability should not be imposed simply because a
drug is dangerous. 3 The majority opined that the Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 402A made clear that a product which
requires a warning of its dangers and is sold without such a warn-
ing is defective.6 The Incollingo court held that the drug manufac-
tured in this case was in need of a warning of its potentially dan-
gerous side effects and concluded that the question of whether an
adequate warning was given by the manufacturer was properly left
to the jury. 5
The supreme court's difficulty with strict products liability fail-
ure to warn cases was most apparent in its 1975 plurality opinion
of Berkebile v Brantly Helicopter Corporation.6 In Berkebile, the
plaintiff's husband had purchased a helicopter manufactured by
the defendant.6 7 During flight, the helicopter had a power failure
and crashed, killing the plaintiff's, husband who was piloting the
helicopter.6 8 In her wrongful death and survival action, the execu-
59. Id. The doctors appealed on two different grounds. Id at 212. The doctor who
first prescribed the medication contended that the evidence did not support a finding that
his conduct was not in accordance with the accepted standards of the medical profession. Id.
The second doctor, who had prescribed the medication without ever seeing the decedent
Mary Ann admitted that he paid no attention to the warnings on the drug, but alleged that
the detail men of the defendant Parke, Davis represented to him that the drug was safe for
extensive uses. Id at 216.
60. Id.
61. Justice Pomeroy wrote the majority opinion, in which Justices Jones, Cohen, Ea-
gen and O'Brien joined. Justice Roberts filed a concurring opinion. Justice Bell filed an
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
62. IncoUingo, 282 A2d at 216.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. The case came before the supreme court again on rearguement, limited to the
question of damages. Id at 225.
66. 462 Pa 83, 337 A2d 893 (1975).
67. Berkebile, 337 A2d at 897.
68. Id.
1991
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trix wife relied on a theory of strict liability under section 402A.
The complaint alleged four different grounds for recovery: (1) the
design of the rotor system of the helicopter was defective and did
not give the average pilot adequate time to put the aircraft into
autorotation during a power failure; (2) the rotor blade was defec-
tive in design and manufacture; (3) the helicopter was defective as
a result of inadequate warnings about possible rotor system risks
and limitations; and (4) the advertizing brochures for the helicop-
ter misrepresented the product's safety. 9 The jury found for the
defendant manufacturer; the superior court reversed.70
Chief Justice Jones' lead opinion,71 joined by Justice (now Chief
Justice) Nix, held that the failure to provide adequate warnings in
itself constituted a defect, even if the manufacturer had exercised
all possible care in the manufacturing of the product.7 In reaching
this conclusion, the Chief Justice stated:
It must be emphasized that the test of necessity of warnings or instructions
is not to be governed by the reasonable man standard. In the strict liability
context we reject standards based upon what the "reasonable" consumer
could be expected to know, or what the "reasonable" manufacturer could be
expected to "foresee" about the consumers of his product.7"
The Chief Justice went on to conclude that the use of the term
"unreasonably dangerous" in section 402A of the Restatement was
not an attempt to intertwine negligence principles with strict lia-
bility law, but rather an effort to promote holding the manufac-
turer to the standard of guarantor, as opposed to insurer, of his
product's safety.74 However, the trial court's charge on "abnormal
use," 76 according to the Chief Justice, had improperly led the jury
69. Id.
70. Id. The first trial resulted in a verdict for the defendant. The superior court or-
dered a new trial due to incorrect charges made to the jury during the trial. Berkebile v
Brantly Helicopter Corp., 219 Pa Super 479, 281 A2d 707 (1971). After the second trial, the
superior court again reversed, stating that the trial judge should have charged the jury that,
in the absence of complete and intelligible warnings, the helicopter was defective. Berkebile
v Brontly Helicopter Corp., 225 Pa Super 349, 311 A2d 140 (1973).
71. Chief Justice Jones submitted the lead opinion in which he was joined by Justice
Nix. Justices Roberts and Pomeroy filed separate concurring opinions. Justices Eagen,
O'Brien and Roberts concurred in the result.
72. Berkebile, 337 A2d at 899 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(2)(a)
(1965)).
73. Berkebile, 337 A2d at 902.
74. Id at 900.
75. The defense asserted by the manufacturer was that the pilot (decedent) had
failed to start the autorotation system within one second of a power failure caused by insuf-
ficient fuel, thereby constituting an abnormal use. Id at 897-98.
An abnormal use is "one [which] a maker could not be expected to guard against in de-
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to believe that the decedent's acts precluded his own recovery on
any theory.7" In so holding, the Chief Justice relied on Ferraro
7"
for the proposition that a plaintiff is precluded from recovery in
strict liability only if he knows of the specific defect eventually
causing the injury and yet voluntarily proceeds to use the prod-
uct.78 Chief Justice Jones also noted that the finding of an assump-
tion of the risk must be based on the individual's own subjective
knowledge.
7 9
One of the issues addressed in the Berkebile plurality opinion
was again presented to the supreme court in Azzarello v Black
Brothers Company, Inc.80 In that case the court re-addressed the
problem of infusion of negligence principles into strict liability
cases. In Azzarello, the plaintiff had pinched his hand between two
rolls of a cutting machine made and sold by the defendant.8 ' Plain-
tiff sued under section 402A. The defendant manufacturer joined
the plaintiff's employer on a negligence theory as an additional de-
fendant.82 This presented the problem of using both strict liability
and negligence terms in the jury instructions. While charging the
jury on strict liability, the trial court repeatedly used the term
"unreasonably dangerous," which had been taken from section
402A.13 The jury found for the defendant manufacturer and
against the employer. The plaintiff appealed, contesting the pro-
priety of the use of the term "unreasonably dangerous" in the trial
court's instructions as to the plaintiff's burden of proof for strict
liability. 4
,In a unanimous opinion by authored by Justice Nix, the court
first pointed out that, although the use of the term "unreasonably
signing his product. So if the product was defective as designed for its ordinary and foresee-
able uses or if defective because of a flaw in it, but a use was made of the product that the
maker could not be expected to guard against, then the accident was not proximately caused
by the product defect." Prosser and Keeton, Torts §102 at 711 (West, 5th ed 1984).
76. Berkebile, 337 A2d at 901.
77. See notes 48 to 52 and accompanying text.
78. Berkebile, 337 A2d at 901.
79. Id (cting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, comment n and § 496D, com-
ment c; Dorsey v Yoder, 331 F Supp 753, 765 (E D Pa 1971).)
80. 480 Pa 547, 391 A2d 1020 (1978).
81. Azzarello, 391 A2d at 1022.
82. Id.
83. Id. See note 37.
84. Azzarello, 391 A2d at 1022. A motion for a new trial was granted by the lower
court en banc, which held that allowing the use of the term "unreasonably dangerous" in
the jury instructions was error under the Berkebile decision. Counsel and the court in Az-
zarello became aware of the Berkebile opinion subsequent to the trial, but before post trial
motions were ruled upon. Id at 1023.
1991
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dangerous" in section 402A had originally been intended to pre-
vent absolute liability of the manufacturer, it had resulted in giv-
ing the plaintiff the burden of proving something similar to negli-
gence.85 Justice Nix then noted that the term carried no
"independent significance," and that substitution of another term
would not significantly resolve the real dilemma.8 6 This dilemma
was, according to the court, "whether the determination as to risk
of loss is a decision to be made by the finder of fact or the court.
'87
In proceeding to answer this question, the Azzarello court held
that issues such as whether a poor design exposing the consumer to
risk of injury entitled an injured consumer to a right of recovery
were questions of law involving social policy considerations."s The
court then determined that whether, under the plaintiff's averment
of the facts, recovery should be allowed was a question of law for
the court; subsequently, the question of whether the facts of the
case supported the complaint should be made by the jury."9
The Azzarello holding was reasserted by the court in Sherk v
Daisy-Heddon.e0 In Sherk, the plaintiffs' son was killed by a B-B
fired from a gun manufactured by the defendant.9 ' The plaintiff-
parents advanced a theory of strict liability for failure to ade-
quately warn of the gun's lethal propensity.92 The jury found in
85. Id at 1025. In reaching this conclusion, the court quoted the California Supreme
Court's decision in Cronin v J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal 3d 121, 104 Cal Rptr 433, 501 P2d
1153 (1972) (use of the term "unreasonably dangerous" gives the plaintiff the burden of
proving an element similar to negligence.)




90. 498 Pa 594, 450 A2d 615 (1982).
91. Sherk, 450 A2d at 615. The gun, a Daisy "Power King" Model 880, was a pump-
up type. The greater the amount of air pumped into the gun, the greater the velocity of the
ensuing shot. Id at 617.
The decedent was shot by his friend, Robert Saenz. Robert's parents had purchased the
gun for him through a mail order catalogue, but had instructed Robert not to use it until his
father had an opportunity to advise him as to its proper use. Robert Saenz had used the gun
without his parents' permission or knowledge prior to the date of the accident. Robert's
father had not yet instructed him on how to handle the gun on the date the accident oc-
curred. Id.
The accident occurred when Robert pointed the gun at James Sherk's head from a dis-
tance of about five feet. Robert, who later testified that he believed the safety catch of the
gun to be engaged when he pointed the barrel at Sherk, called Sherk's name, intending to
scare him by pulling the trigger as Sherk turned around. Robert also testified that he knew
"this was something (he] shouldn't be doing" and that "this was something that could injure
[his] friend." Id at 618.
92. The plaintiffs also based their complaint on negligence and misrepresentation. Id
at 617.
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favor of the defendant manufacturer; a panel of the superior court
ordered a new trial, however, holding that evidence of the commu-
nity perception of B-B guns manufactured by the defendant was
improperly excluded.
93
The issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on appeal was
whether the evidence of community perception should have been
admitted despite the knowledge of the decedent's friend, Robert
Saenz, who fired the lethal shot.9 Noting that Saenz and the dece-
dent had been firing the gun at glass bottles, which exploded upon
impact, and intended to use it to kill rats and rabbits, the supreme
court, in an opinion by Justice Roberts, 5 determined that Saenz's
knowledge of the gun's power was such as to make him legally
chargeable with knowledge of the gun's lethal propensity. 6 Thus,
the court concluded, no warning of this lethal propensity was nec-
essary and, in fact, the lack of a warning was not causally related
to the decedent's death.97
Justice Larsen, joined by Chief Justice O'Brien, dissented on the
grounds that the subsequent negligence of Saenz was foreseeable
and should not, therefore, have absolved Daisy of liability.9 8
When viewed in conjunction with prior Pennsylvania decisions,
the holding of Mackowick presents an extension of the restrictions
on strict products liability failure to warn recovery. The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court established the cause of action in Webb and
established the defenses to the cause of action in Ferraro. In Incol-
lingo, the court approved of strict liability for failure to adequately
warn, but the court was then presented with the problems of negli-
gence principles which remained in the cause of action through
Berkebile. The court finally seemed to resolve this problem in Az-
zarello, by determining that threshold recovery questions were to
93. Id. The superior court's opinion may be found at 285 Pa Super 320, 427 A2d 657
(1981).
94. Sherk, 450 A2d at 617. In reversing the superior court, the supreme court held
that the superior court was correct in ruling that the plaintiffs could proceed on theories of
both negligence and strict liability, but incorrect in concluding that the trial court's failure
to charge the jury on negligence or to admit the evidence of community perception de-
manded a new trial. Id.
95. Justice Roberts wrote the lead opinion in which he was joined by Justice Hutch-
inson, who also filed a concurring opinion. Justice McDermott concurred in the result. Jus-
tice Larsen and Chief Justice O'Brien dissented.
96. Id at 618. Saenz testified that he knew the gun was more powerful than those he
had previously been accustomed to and that a B-B fired from the gun could blind a person.
He further testified that he knew he should never point a gun at anyone. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id at 622. Justice McDermott concurred in the result.
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be determined by the trial judge. This thesis has apparently been
extended to failure to adequately warn cases by the court's holding
in Mackowick.
Apparently, under Mackowick and Azzarello, the plaintiff in any
strict products liability action, whether based in design defect or
failure to warn, must first convince the trial judge that the product
is defective. The most important question in any products liability
action is, therefore, a question of law; only then are peripheral is-
sues resolved by the finder of fact. The balancing test to be used
by the court in making this determination is "whether, under the
plaintiff's averment of the facts, recovery would be justified."99
This determination is to be made on the basis of social policy con-
siderations such as whether the utility of the product outweighs
the unavoidable danger it poses, 10 or whether the warnings of dan-
gerous propensities of a product are sufficient to insulate the
maker from liability for harm caused by the product. 1' 1
In support of its extension of the Azzarello balancing test to fail-
ure to warn cases, the Mackowick majority cited cases from other
states which had adopted a similar type of "judicial screening."102
Support for a judicial screening has been far from unanimous,
however, and the Azzarello holding itself has been soundly criti-
cized. 03 The crux of this criticism is essentially that the test lacks
any guiding factors for the judge to use in determining if the "bal-
ancing" warrants allowing the plaintiff to go forward. 0 Addition-
ally, the Azzarello holding has been criticized for removing the
risk-utility analysis from the jury' 0° and not giving sufficient indi-
99. Mackowick, 575 A2d at 103.
100. Azzarello, 391 A2d at 1026.
101. Id.
102. Mackowick, 575 A2d at 103. The majority opinion cited Byrne v SCM Corp., 182
Ill App3d 523, 131 Ill Dec 421, 538 NE2d 796 (1989); Huber v Niagara Machine & Tool
Works, 430 NW2d 465 (Minn 1988); Butz v Werner, 438 NW2d 509 (ND 1989); Ewen v
McLean Trucking Co., 70 Or App 575, 689 P2d 1309 (1984); Munoz v Gulf Oil Co., 732
SW2d 62 (Tex App 1987); O'Donnell v City of Casper, 696 P2d 1278 (Wyo 1985).
The Mackowick majority specifically quoted from a Michigan Court of Appeals case with
facts similar to those before the supreme court in Mackowick. Ross v Jaybird Automation,
Inc., 172 Mich App 603, 432 NW2d 374 (1988). Mackowick, 575 A2d at 103.
103. See John W. Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33
Vand L Rev 551 (1980); James A. Henderson, Jr., Renewed Judicial Controversy Over De-
fective Product Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 Minn L
Rev 773 (1979); Comment, Returning the "Balance" to Design Defect Litigation in Penn-
sylvania: A Critique of Azzarello v Black Brothers Company, 89 Dickinson L Rev 149
(1984).
104. Comment, 89 Dickenson L Rev at 169 (cited in note 103).
105. Henderson, 63 Minn L Rev at 798 (cited in note 103).
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cation of the stage at which the balancing test is to be employed. 0 6
The Mackowick opinion does little to meet these arguably well-
founded attacks.
Although the Mackowick court claimed never to reach the issue
of whether the plaintiff needed to have knowledge of the specific
defect causing his injury,"'7 the balancing test used by the majority
yields a result which is dispositive of this question. The court in
Mackowick used an objective "should have known" standard in its
balancing test in determining that an electrician should have
known the risk posed by the live uninsulated fuses and that, there-
fore, the warning given by the manufacturer was adequate as a
matter of law.108 This is substantively no different from deciding to
use an objective, contributory negligence standard in addition to
the subjectively-based assumption of the risk test. The objective
standard is enforce by the judge, apparently prior, and without re-
gard, to any defense asserted by the manufacturer.10
The effect of the Azzarello balancing test as applied in Mack-
owick is, therefore, to reinsert the defense of contributory negli-
gence, previously excluded from products liability by section 402A,
comment n as adopted in Pennsylvania by the Ferraro decision,
and to mask the defense as a threshold decision to be made at the
outset of plaintiff's case using social policy considerations.
Foster A. Stewart, Jr.
Professor Henderson stated:
[T]he Supreme Court of Pennsylvania seized upon this case as an opportunity to
articulate a new and different test for design defect and, in the process, reached con-
clusions that can only be described as extraordinary. At the outset the court recog-
nized the relevance of cost-benefit analysis in cases of this sort . . . Remarkably,
however, the court concluded that the issue of unreasonable danger should never be
given to the jury to decide.
Id.
106. Wade, 33 Vand L Rev at 561 (cited in note 103).
Professor Wade felt the problem was in interpreting the Azzarello opinion:
The court may be saying that the jury merely determines the facts and that the judge
determines whether the product is actionable on those facts. But the judge's decision
is on the "plaintiff's averment of the facts." Is this treated like a demurrer or a mo-
tion to dismiss?
Id.
107. Mackowick, 575 A2d at 104.
108. Id at 103-04.
109. See note 106.
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